Do Economics Departments With Lower Tenure Probabilities Pay Higher Faculty Salaries? by Ehrenberg, Ronald G et al.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection 
11-1998 
Do Economics Departments With Lower Tenure Probabilities Pay 
Higher Faculty Salaries? 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg 
Cornell University, rge2@cornell.edu 
Paul J. Pieper 
University of Illinois at Chicago 
Rachel A. Willis 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the Benefits and Compensation Commons, Education Economics Commons, Higher Education 
Commons, Labor Economics Commons, and the Labor Relations Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Do Economics Departments With Lower Tenure Probabilities Pay Higher Faculty 
Salaries? 
Abstract 
The simplest competitive labor market model asserts that if tenure is a desirable job characteristic for 
professors, they should be willing to pay for it by accepting lower salaries. Conversely, if an institution 
unilaterally reduces the probability that its assistant professors receive tenure, it will have to pay higher 
salaries to attract new faculty. Our paper tests this theory using data on salary offers accepted by new 
assistant professors at economics departments in the United States during the 1974-75 to 1980-81 
period, along with data on the proportion of new Ph.D.s hired by each department between 1970 and 1980 
that received tenure in the department or at a comparable or higher quality department within the first 
eight years of receipt of their Ph.D.s. We find evidence that supports the hypothesis that a tradeoff 
existed. Equally importantly, departments that offered low tenure probabilities to assistant professors 
also paid higher salaries to their tenured faculty. We attribute this to low tenure probabilities inducing 
higher effort from assistant professors and thus leading to higher productivity of faculty ultimately 
promoted to tenure. 
Keywords 
economics, faculty, salaries, tenure, academic labor market, doctorates 
Disciplines 
Benefits and Compensation | Economics | Education Economics | Higher Education | Labor Economics | 
Labor Relations 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Ehrenberg, R. G, Pieper, P. J., & Willis, R. A. (1998). Do economics departments with lower tenure 
probabilities pay higher faculty salaries? [Electronic version]. Review of Economics and Statistics 80(4), 
503-512. 
Required Publisher Statement 
© Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/664 
DO ECONOMICS DEPARTMENTS WITH LOWER TENURE PROBABILITIES 
PAY HIGHER FACULTY SALARIES? 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Paul J. Pieper, and Rachel A. Willis* 
Abstract-The simplest competitive labor market model asserts that if 
tenure is a desirable job characteristic for professors, they should be 
willing to pay for it by accepting lower salaries. Conversely, if an 
institution unilaterally reduces the probability that its assistant professors 
receive tenure, it will have to pay higher salaries to attract new faculty. Our 
paper tests this theory using data on salary offers accepted by new assistant 
professors at economics departments in the United States during the 
1974-75 to 1980-81 period, along with data on the proportion of new 
Ph.D.s hired by each department between 1970 and 1980 that received 
tenure in the department or at a comparable or higher quality department 
within the first eight years of receipt of their Ph.D.s. We find evidence that 
supports the hypothesis that a tradeoff existed. Equally importantly, 
departments that offered low tenure probabilities to assistant professors 
also paid higher salaries to their tenured faculty. We attribute this to low 
tenure probabilities inducing higher effort from assistant professors and 
thus leading to higher productivity of faculty ultimately promoted to 
tenure. 
I. Introduction 
J ISING TUITION levels in Aiferican private colleges 
and universities, which have far exceeded the rate of 
inflation for over a decade, have increasingly brought these 
institutions under close public scrutiny and led to calls for 
their increased efficiency and accountability. These pres- 
sures have been exacerbated by a number of factors, 
including the abolition of mandatory retirement for faculty, 
which became effective in January 1]994. The end of 
mandatory retirement has led to fears that colleges and 
universities will become increasingly populated by an aged 
nonproductive heavily tenured professorate whose relatively 
high salaries will place increased financial burdens on 
institutions and whose failure to retire at reasonable ages 
will reduce the ability of institutions to diversify their 
faculty along race, gender, and ethnic lines.1 In fact, during 
the 1996-97 academic year, 65.6% of all full-time college 
and university faculty members in the United States had 
tenured appointments.2 
Economists have provided a variety of explanations, in 
addition to traditional academic freedom ones, to justify a 
tenure system. These include that by providing a form of job 
security for tenured faculty, the system encourages senior 
faculty to share their knowledge with younger colleagues 
and to hire as colleagues those younger applicants who they 
perceive to be most talented, that it serves as a "tournament" 
that provides an incentive for nontenured faculty to work 
harder than would otherwise be the case, and that it solves 
the incentive problem needed to get talented people to obtain 
very specialized and expensive training that may be useful 
only in well-defined and narrowly specialized tasks.3 In 
addition, the fact that tenure is typically accompanied by 
increasing salaries over the life cycle, even though there is 
evidence that productivity eventually declines with age, can 
be rationalized as part of a life-cycle incentive compensation 
scheme that provides incentives for both nontenured and 
tenured faculty to exert more effort than otherwise would be 
the case.4 
However, the abolition of mandatory retirement for 
college and university faculty has caused many people 
(primarily outside of academia) to focus on tenure's costs. 
Proposals to eliminate or modify tenure have been put forth, 
and one institution recently unilaterally eliminated tenure 
for its faculty.5 Absent from the discussion of these propos- 
als has been an awareness of the simplest competitive labor 
market model that asserts that if tenure is a desirable job 
characteristic for professors, they should be willing to pay 
for it, by accepting lower salaries.6 Conversely, according to 
this theory, a reduction in tenure probabilities should reduce 
the attractiveness of faculty positions and thus increase the 
salaries necessary to attract people into doctoral study and 
acadeniia. 
Do departments that offer new assistant professors low 
tenure probabilities actually pay higher starting salaries for 
new assistant professors than otherwise comparable depart- 
ments who offer higher tenure probabilities? This paper first 
addresses this issue. It uses salary offers accepted by new 
assistant professors at economics departments in United 
States colleges and universities during the 1974/75 to 
1980/81 periods, along with data on the proportions of new 
Ph.D.s hired by each department between 1970 and 1980 
that received tenure in the department or at a comparable or 
higher quality department within the first eight years of 
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1 That these fears may not be justified is discussed by Rees and Smithi 
(1991) and Hammond and Morgan (1991) who evaluate the likely effect of 
the abolition of mandatory retirement on faculty retirement rates, and by 
Hamermesh (1994), Rees and Smith (1991), Levin and Stephan (1991), 
and Stephan and Levin (1992) who study and sunnmaiize studies of 
life-cycle faculty productivity differentials. 
2 See American Association of University Professors (1997, table 12). 
3 See, for example, Stigler (1984), Carmichael (1988), Lazear and Rosen 
(1981), McPherson and Winston (1993), and Siow (1994). 
4 Lazear (1979). The incentive for tenured faculty to exert more effort 
than would otherwise be the case follows in this model from tenure being 
an implicit contract which at best provides a promise that nominal salaries 
will not be reduced. "Nonperformers" thus face the possibility of zero 
nomninal salary increases and their real salaries being reduced each period 
by the rate of inflation. 
5 Henderson (1994) and Bennett (1994). 
6 This theory, which goes back at least to Adam Smith, is summarized in 
Ehrenberg and Smith (1997, chapt. 8). 
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receipt of their Ph.D.s, to estimate if a tradeoff did exist 
between starting salaries and tenure probabilities during the 
1970s.7 
A tradeoff may also exist, however, between the tenure 
probabilities faced by assistant professors and the salaries a 
department pays to tenured faculty for two reasons. First, 
ceteris paribus, lower tenure probabilities for assistant 
professors imply either that a department will have fewer 
tenured faculty in steady state or that it will hire a greater 
share of its tenured faculty from faculty already employed at 
other institutions. Faculty hired away from other institutions 
often earn higher salaries than those promoted from within 
because the former must be compensated for their monetary 
and psychological cost of mobility and induced to leave their 
original institution.8 To the extent that lower tenure probabili- 
ties for assistant professors do imply that a greater share of 
tenured faculty were hired away from other institutions, one 
should therefore also expect to observe higher salaries for 
tenured faculty in this situation, other factors held constant. 
Second, low tenure probabilities at an institution may 
induce new assistant professors to work harder so that if they 
fail to get tenure at the institution, they will have a stronger 
record to increase their employability elsewhere. This stron- 
ger record, however, will also increase their productivity and 
value to their original department and hence the salary it will 
have to pay them if they are granted tenure. Put another way, 
a low expected tenure probability can be thought of as being 
part of a Lazear and Rosen (1981) type of tournament with a 
greater reward for winning. We test both these hypotheses by 
using the AEA data, which also contained information on 
average salary by rank for economics department faculty, to 
estimate if a tradeoff existed between average salaries of 
tenured faculty and the tenure probabilities offered new 
assistant professors during the 1970s. 
To motivate the empirical work that follows, the next 
section presents a simple conceptual model of the salary- 
tenure probability relationship. Section III presents descrip- 
tive statistics on the starting salaries paid to assistant 
professor of economics during the 1974-1980 period and 
estimates of the tenure probabilities they faced. Our empiri- 
cal estimates of the starting salary-tenure probability relation- 
ship appears in section IV. Section V briefly discusses the 
relationship between the tenure probabilities faced by new 
assistant professors in a department and the salaries of 
tenured faculty in the department. Empirical estimates are 
provided that indicate that low tenure probabilities require 
an institution to pay also more for tenured faculty. Finally, 
the paper ends with a discussion of our findings, alternative 
hypotheses that are consistent with these findings, and the 
directions in which future research might proceed. 
II. A Simple Conceptual Model of the Tradeoff between 
Tenure Probabilities and Starting Salaries in Academia 
To motivate the empirical research, consider the follow- 
ing simple conceptual model. Risk-neutral new Ph.D.s, who 
are all of equal quality, are confronted with job offers from 
universities of equal quality.9 These offers vary only in their 
pecuniary compensation and their probability of receiving 
tenure. Individuals are assumed to have professional careers 
that last N periods, and the tenure decision is made at each 
institution after a probationary period of P years. 
During the probationary period an individual is assumed 
to receive a fixed salary per period of W i at institution I and 
to receive a benefit package at that institution which 
increases her compensation by a multiple bi (>1). The 
individual believes that the probability of receiving tenure at 
institution I is Ti and that if she receives tenure, her salary 
per period will be increased by a multiple gi (> 1) to the level 
WTi = Wpigi, which will then remain constant for the 
remainder of her worklife. If the individual fails to receive 
tenure, she will receive a lower compensation package in 
alternative employment of C (C < WTi). Finally, for simplic- 
ity, voluntary mobility across institutions is ignored. If the 
individual receives tenure, she is assumed to remain with the 
institution throughout her career. Several of these assump- 
tions are generalized in a later section. 
Given these assumptions, the individual's expected pre- 
sent value of compensation if she chooses employment 
initially at university I is 
v Wpibie-rt dt + [(TiWpibigi) 
+ (1 - Ti) c]e-rt dt 
or 
Wpibi i 
V [(1 - e-P) + Tigi(e-rP - e-N)] 
r 
(1 - Ti)c ( P-er)(2) 
+ (e-~ _rP - rN) 
r 
If individuals care only about their expected present value 
of compensation, an assumption which is relaxed in the 
empirical work, then in equilibrium, the expected present 
value of compensation must be equal at all institutions for 
equal "quality" faculty. Setting V equal to a constant and 
differentiating, it is straightforward to show that 
awPi awPi awPi 
a <0 < a 
0, < ? (3) 
7 As will become clear later, the sample period is dictated by data 
availability. 
8 For evidence that tenured faculty hired from the outside tend to earn 
more than tenured faculty promoted from within, see Ransom (1993). 
9 Institutional and individual quality differences will be accounted for in 
the empirical analyses. 
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That is, ceteris paribus, institutions that offer more generous 
benefit packages, higher growth rates of earnings between 
the nontenured and tenured ranks, and higher probabilities 
of receiving tenure will offer lower starting salaries. 
III. Descriptive Statistics 
Starting in the 1974/75 academic year, the AEA has 
conducted an annual survey of economics departments that 
requests information on the median starting salary offers 
accepted by new assistant professors. The AEA made the 
responses to these surveys available to us for the 1974/75 to 
1980/81 periods under the restriction that the data be kept 
confidential. 
Response rates for departments that offered only bach- 
elors' or masters' degrees were not always high, and many of 
these institutions were small and hired only a few faculty 
during the decade of the 1970s. The ex post tenure probabili- 
ties that can be computed for these institutions (see below) 
would be based on a small number of observations and 
would be a very imperfect measure of the ex ante tenure 
probabilities that a new assistant professor faced. Hence, the 
analyses reported in this paper are confined to the doctorate 
granting departments, which numbered roughly 110 during 
the period. 
Some of these departments, however, did not regularly 
respond to the AEA questionnaire. Moreover, in any one 
year, less than half of the departments actually made offers 
that were accepted at the new assistant professor level to 
individuals who were working on their dissertations but had 
yet to complete them (ABDs) or who had a Ph.D. in hand. 
For the seven-year period, we actually have data on 286 such 
offers to new assistant professors-roughly 40 a year. The 
286 offers came from 86 different Ph.D. granting departments.10 
Table 1 presents descriptive data on these starting salaries 
by year. As panel A indicates, the mean median accepted 
salary offer rose from $13,708 in 1974/75 to $20,081 in 
1980/81. The standard deviation of the offers in any year 
was small; less than $1200 in most years. Depending upon 
one's perspective, this might reflect a highly competitive 
market or one in which salary collusion was prevalent. (Prior 
to 1980 the departments also reported their planned offers 
for the next year, and this information was distributed at the 
"chairmen's breakfast" at the annual AEA meetings.) It is 
this limited variability across institutions each year that our 
empirical research, presented in the next section, will s"eek to 
"explain." The small standard deviations do mask, however, 
the $5000 to $7000 range between the minimum and 
maximum offers that existed each year. 
Each year approximately 20% to 25% of the offers went to 
individuals who had yet to complete their Ph.D.s (ABDs). 
Might some of the variation in any year simply reflect lower 
offers made to ABDs to provide an incentive for them to 
complete their degrees quickly? Panel B of table 1 provides 
similar descriptive statistics for the subset of offers that went 
to individuals who had their Ph.D.s in hand by the start of 
their appointment. While the mean median offers are now 
marginally higher, neither the standard deviation nor the 
range of offers changes very much. Thus, while it will be 
important to control for whether an offer went to a person 
who had a degree in hand in our empirical analyses, this 
variable will most likely not explain most of the variability 
in offers across departments. 
A key premise of our study is that tenure probabilities 
vary across institutions, so it is important to examine 
whether this is true. Information on the probability of 
achieving tenure for new Ph.D.s hired at each department 
comes from a database constructed by two of us, Willis and 
Pieper."1 This database includes information on over 1400 
individuals who both obtained a Ph.D. degree in economics 
from a United States department between 1970 and 1980 
and, within two years of receiving their degrees, also 
assumed a position as an assistant professor at a United 
States economics department that granted either master's or 
doctoral degrees. The annual doctoral degree list published 
in the American Economic Review is the source for the new 
economics Ph.D. data. This list was matched against the 
faculty positions reported in the Economic Institute's peri- 
odic Guide to Graduate Study in Economics to determine 
new assistant professor appointments. The Guide includes 
rank by employing institution for nearly all doctoral degree 
TABLE 1 -STARTING SALARIES FOR NEW ASSISTANT PROFESSORS OF ECONOMICS AT PH.D. GRANTING INSTITUTIONS 
(A) (B) 
All New Assistant Professors Those with Ph.D.s 
Year n Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. n Meaii (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. 
1974-75 45 13,758 (1106) 10,636 16,500 36 13,766 (1214) 10,636 16,500 
1975-76 34 14,544 (1177) 12,375 17,500 25 14,711 (1220) 12,375 17,500 
1976-77 44 15,456 (1006) 14,000 18,000 35 15,539 (1000) 14,000 18,000 
1977-78 43 16,147 (1149) 13,419 19,450 36 16,197 (1218) 13,419 19,450 
1978-79 40 16,983 (1067) 15,000 20,000 29 17,144 (1174) 15,000 20,000 
1979-80 39 18,465 (1253) 16,500 21,500 29 18,627 (1308) 16,500 21,500 
1980-81 41 20,081 (1623) 17,500 24,000 32 20,437 (1591) 17,500 24,000 
Notes: Where n is the number of institutions' starting salary offers reported. If an institution made offers to individuals both with and without Ph.D.s in a year, the institution would show up 
twice in Panel A in the year. 
Source: Authors' calculations from institutional responses to the American Economics Association's Annual Survey of Economic Departments, 1974-75 to 1 980-8 1 
10 These departments are listed in appendix A. " See Willis (1990) and WVillis and Pieper (1993). 
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granting schools and a large number of master's degree 
granting schools.'2 Sample members' academic employment 
histories were collected from later volumes of the Guide, 
supplemented by the AEA's periodic Survey of Members and 
by college catalogues. 
From these data it is possible to compute four different 
measures of the proportion of newly hired assistant profes- 
sors during the 1970-1980 period in each department who 
received tenure at the department or at one of comparable or 
better quality within the first eight years of receipt of their 
Ph.D.s. The first, TENl, is the proportion of new assistant 
professors who received tenure at the institution or at 
another institution in the same "quality tier." Departmental 
equality is measured here by the Jones et al. (1982) ranking 
of programs and the institutions are somewhat arbitrarily 
grouped into the following five tiers: 1 (ranks 1-6), 2 (ranks 
7-15), 3 (ranks 16-30), 4 (ranks 31-47), and 5 (all other 
programs).'3 
The second, TEN2, is the proportion of new assistant 
professors who received tenure at the institution or at 
another institution in the same, or a better, quality tier. The 
third, TEN3, is the proportion who received tenure at the 
institution itself. Finally, TEN4 is the proportion who 
received tenure at the institution or a better ranked one; here 
the actual Jones et al. ranking rather than the quality tier of 
the department is used in the comparisons. 
TEN3 is the measure one typically thinks of when one 
thinks of a tenure probability. However, it is not necessarily 
the best measure to use in our empirical analyses. An 
institution that offers a 0.2 tenure probability at itself and a 
0.3 probability of obtaining tenure at an equal or better 
quality institution may be viewed as equally or more 
attractive, other factors held constant, than a similar institu- 
tion that offers only a 0.5 tenure probability at itself. Which 
tenure probability is the appropriate measure to use in 
empirical research is an open question. 
In practice, as we shall see, it makes little difference 
because the four measures are very highly correlated across 
institutions.'4 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the 
four tenure probability measures. Overall, the mean un- 
weighted own tenure probability, TEN3, is 0.41 and has a 
standard eviation of 0.22. The alternative measures' means 
are only slightly larger, the largest being TEN2 at 0.5. This 
suggests that individuals who start out at one institution only 
infrequently find tenured positions at an equal or better 
quality institution. 
When the institutions are broken down by tier, each of the 
tenure probability measures tends to increase as one moves 
from the highest quality to lowest quality tier. For example, 
the mean value of TEN3 is 0.33 at tier 1 departments but 
0.45 at tier 5 departments. However, this intertier variation 
in mean tenure probabilities is small relative to the intratier 
variation across departments. Focusing on TEN3 again, this 
measure varies from 0.21 to 0.57 across the six tier 1 
schools, and the intratier standard eviation of TEN3 ranges 
from 0.13 to 0.25 across tiers. Hence variations in tenure 
probabilities across institutions do not reflect primarily 
differences in institutional quality.'5 
IV. Econometric Estimates: New Assistant Professor 
Salaries 
To test whether a tradeoff did exist between starting 
assistant professor salaries and tenure probabilities across 
economics departments during the 1974/75 to 1980/81 
period, equations are estimated of the form 
Wpit = bo + bITpi + b2bit + b3git + b4XAt + Eit. (4) 
Here Wpit is the logarithm of department I's median starting 
salary for new assistant professors in year t during the 
period, TPi is the proportion of newly hired Ph.D.s in 
department I during the period that received tenure at that 
institution or at an institution of equal or better quality, bit is 
the faculty benefit rate at the institution in which department 
TABLE 2.-ALTERNATIVE TENURE PROBABILITY MEASURES AT PH.D. GRANTING ECONOMICS DEPARTMENTS FACED BY NEW ASSISTANT PROFESSORS DURING 
THE 1970-80 PERIOD 
Tenure Mean (Std. Dev.) [Min./Max.] 
Probability 
Measure All Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 Tier 5 
TENI .46 (.22) [0/1] .37 (.11) [.25/.57] .41 (.18) [.20/.51] .40 (.16) [.17/.69] .44 (.50) [.14/.81] .50 (.25) [0/1] 
TEN2 .50 (.22) [0/1] .37 (.11) [.25/.51] .44 (.17) [.20/.67] .44 (.17) [.17/.97] .48 (.19) [.14/.88] .54 (.25) [0/1] 
TEN3 .41 (.22) [0/1] .33 (.13) [.21/.57] .35 (.14) [.17/.57] .37 (.14) [.17/.62] .41 (.18) [.14/.81] .45 (.25) [0/1] 
TEN4 .47 (.22) [0/1] .36 (.12) [.21/.57] .40 (.16) [.21/.62] .43 (.17) [.17/.77] .46 (.19) [.14/.88] .51 (.65) [0/1] 
n 104 6 9 14 18 57 
Notes: Where TENI-proportion of the 1970-1980 new assistant professors who received tenure at the institution or another institution in the same tier; TEN2-proportion of the 1970-1980 new assistant professors 
who received tenure at the institution or at another institution in the same or better tier; TEN3-proportion of the 1970-1980 new assistant professors who received tenure at the institution; TEN4-proportion of the 
1970-1980 new assistant professors who received tenure at the institution or at a better ranked institution 
Source: Authors' computations from data on the careers of economists who received Ph.D.s from American universities between 1970 and 1980 and then became assistant professors. See Willis ( 1990) and Willis and 
Pieper (1993) for details. 
12 College catalogs and the job announcement section of the American 
Economic Review were used by Willis and Pieper to obtain information 
about new hires at institutions that were not included in an issue of the 
Guide. 
13 Willis and Pieper (1993) provide an empirical justification for these 
groupings. 
14 The lowest pairwise correlation is 0.92. 
15 Indeed, the within-tier correlation of TEN3 and a school's quality rank 
is less than 0.3 in absolute value for each of tiers 2 through 5. 
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I is located in year t, and git is the growth rate in salaries at 
department I that occurs when tenure is received. This 
growth rate is empirically specified as the ratio of average 
associate professor to average assistant professor salaries in 
the department in year t. 
The Xi, are vectors of other variables that are expected to 
influence starting salaries. The latter include estimates of the 
cost of living in the area in which the department is located 
as well as dichotomous year variables (since starting salaries 
vary over time), the quality tier of the institution, and the 
quality of the faculty that the department has hired, and 
whether the salary offer was to someone who had a Ph.D. in 
hand. 
Ceteris paribus, departments will have to pay higher 
salaries if they are located in high cost-of-living areas or if 
they want to attract high-quality faculty. Conversely, higher 
quality departments can offer lower salaries because of the 
better nonpecuniary conditions of employment that they 
offer, such as lower teaching loads, better research support, 
and better colleagues and students. Faculty denied tenure at 
higher quality departments may also have better alternative 
employment opportunities than faculty denied tenure at 
lower quality departments, and this also will reduce the 
starting salaiy needed to attract faculty to the higher quality 
institutions. 16 
Cost-of-living differences across areas in each year are 
controlled for in the analyses reported here by the logarithm 
of the median value of owner-occupied housing in 1979 in 
the city in which the institution is located and the average 
combined state income and sales tax at a $20,000 adjusted 
gross income (in 1979 dollars) in the state in which the 
institution is located.17 The faculty benefit rate at the 
institution is obtained for 1979/80, the first year that it was 
collected, from AAUP (1980). Not all institutions could be 
matched to housing value or benefit data, and the sample 
used in the estimation that follows is reduced to 263 
observations. 
Table 3 presents the estimated salary equations for the 
four different tenure probability measures. Turning first to 
the "control variables," all have the anticipated signs. 
Higher benefit rates BEN are associated with lower starting 
salaries, while higher housing values LMEDVAL and higher 
state average income and sales tax rates TAX are associated 
with higher starting salaries. In each of these cases, the 
magnitude of the relationship is smaller (in absolute value) 
than the one-to-one relationships that one might expect. This 
may reflect measurement error and the facts that housing 
values and tax rates are only two components of the cost of 
living and the benefit rate on the average salary level is not 
TABLE 3.-DETERMINANTS OF THE LOGARITHM OF NEW ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS STARTING SALARIES AT 
PH.D. GRANTING INSTITUTIONS: AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 1974-75 TO 1980-81 SAMPLE (ABSOLUTE VALUE T 
STATISTICS) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
TEN1 -.052 (2.2) 
TEN2 -.060 (2.6) 
TEN3 -.052 (2.2) 
TEN4 -.068 (3.0) -.068 (2.0) 
BEN -.004 (4.3) -.004 (4.2) -.004 (4.0) -.004 (4.0) -.004 (2.9) 
RASSOC -.214 (5.5) -.215 (5.6) -.220 (5.5) -.222 (5.7) -.201 (4.6) 
PHD .037 (4.0) .037 (4.0) .038 (4.0) .037 (4.0) .039 (4.0) 
LMEDVAL .029 (2.6) .029 (2.6) .028 (2.5) .029 (2.7) .036 (2.1) 
TAX .006 (1.7) .006 (1.8) .005 (1.5) .006 (1.7) .005 (1.1) 
YR75 .058 (3.9) .057 (3.9) .057 (3.9) .057 (3.9) .053 (4.0) 
YR76 .117 (8.3) .116 (8.2) .116 (8.2) .114 (8.2) .111 (8.6) 
YR77 .169 (12.2) .169 (12.3) .169 (12.2) .169 (12.4) .165 (13.0) 
YR78 .232 (16.5) .231 (16.5) .232 (16.4) .231 (16.6) .226 (17.7) 
YR79 .311 (22.2) .311 (22.2) .311 (22.1) .310 (22.3) .298 (23.0) 
YR80 .384 (26.9) .384 (27.0) .383 (26.8) .383 (27.1) .381 (28.9) 
TI -.074 (4.8) -.079 (4.9) -.072 (4.7) -.070 (5.1) -.092 (3.8) 
T2 -.013 (0.9) -.017 (1.1) -.012 (0.5) -.018 (1.1) -.014 (0.6) 
T3 -.022 (1.8) -.023 (1.9) -.019 (1.6) -.021 (1.8) -.016 (0.9) 
T4 -.001 (0.1) -.001 (0.1) -.002 (0.2) -.002 (0.1) .004 (0.2) 
R2 .808 .809 .808 .811 .821 
Notes: n = 263 in all equations. Estimation in equation (5) uses an error components model in which departmental-specific random effects are assumed. All other 
equations are estimated by ordinary least squares. 
Where: TENl, TEN2, TEN3, and TEN4, estimated probability of gaining tenure (see Table 2 for precise definitions); BEN, benefits as a share of average salary at 
the university in 1979-80; RASSOC, ratio of average associate to average assistant professor salary in the department in the year; PHD, 1 = new assistant professor 
had a Ph.D., 0 = ABD; LMEDVAL, logarithm of the median value of owner occupied housing in the city in 1979-80; TAX, average combined state income and 
sales tax rate at a $20,000 adjusted gross income (in 1979 dollars) in the year; YRJ, 1 = year j, 0 = other (1974-75 is the omitted category); TJ, 1 = department is in 
tier j, 0 = other (Tier S is the omitted category); LNSAL, logarithm of new assistant professor starting salary in the department in the year 
Sources: (A) Annual AEA Departmental Surveys-LNSAL, RASSOC, PHD; (B) American Association of University Professors (1980)-BEN; (C) U.S. Bureau 
of the Census (1983)-LMEDVAL; (D) Willis (1990) and Willis and Pieper (l993)-TENl, TEN2, TEN3, TEN4; (E) National Academy of Science (1982)-TI, 
T2, T3, T4; and (F) Feenberg and Rosen (1986)-TAX. 
16 In terms of equation (2), c will be higher at high-quality institutions, 
and it is straightforward to show that the second cross derivative of Wp 
with respect to c and T is positive. 
17 The average state tax rate data come from Feenberg and Rosen (1986) 
who compute and present these rates for the 1977-1983 period. We used 
their 1977 rates for the 1974/75 to 1977/8 data and their 1978, 1979, and 
1980 rates, respectively, for data from the next three academic years. 
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perfectly correlated with the benefit rate on new assistant 
professor salaries. 
As expected, those institutions in which the ratio of 
associate to assistant professor salaries is higher (RASSOC) 
pay lower starting salaries. Similarly, individuals with 
Ph.D.s in hand received starting salaries that were roughly 
3% higher than those individuals who were ABD. 
Attempts to control for the quality distribution of the 
faculty hired by the institution by including the shares of an 
institution's new hires coming from the various quality tiers 
of doctoral programs never yielded statistically significant 
results. In part, this occurred because the quality tier that an 
institution is in is highly correlated with the quality tiers of 
the institutions from which it draws its faculty. In part, this 
occurred because the quality of, say, a Harvard Ph.D. who is 
hired at Yale is very different from the quality of a Harvard 
Ph.D. who is hired at "Podunk." 
The omission of new hire quality data means that the 
included tier dichotomous variables capture the net effect of 
both departmental quality and new hire quality on starting 
salaries. Only the coefficients for top tier schools are 
statistically significant and their negative coefficients imply 
that, other factors held constant, top tier schools pay 
between 7% and 8% less than other schools. 
Turning to the variables of key interest to us, the tenure 
probability variables, the coefficient of each proves to be 
negative and statistically significant from zero. The models 
are marginally improved when the tenure probability is 
defined to include receiving tenure at an equal or better 
quality department (TEN2, TEN4) and perform the best 
when "better quality" is defined to be better ranked (TEN4) 
instead of better tier (TEN2). 
In the preferred specification (column 4), reducing the 
tenure probability from the mean in the sample of roughly 
0.5 (see table 2) to 0 implies an increase in the starting salary 
for new assistant professors of roughly 3.4%.18 Similarly, 
reducing the tenure probability by 0.1 implies an increase in 
the starting salary of only 0.68%. While increases of these 
magnitudes may seem small, one should remember that 
economics is a field with excellent employment opportuni- 
ties in the nonacademic sector. As noted in footnote 16, the 
compensating wage differential that must be paid for re- 
duced tenure prospects will be smaller in this situation. 
Several extensions warrant brief discussion here. First, 
one may be concerned that our ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates are inefficient and produce inconsistent standard 
error estimates because they assume that error terms for 
multiple observations in the same department are indepen- 
dent. As indicated in appendix A, our sample contains 
multiple observations for many schools. To take account of 
this possibility, we reestimated the model in table 3, column 
4, using an error components model in which department- 
specific random effects were assumed to exist. The resulting 
coefficients appear in column 5. They are very similar to 
those found in column 4 in terms of both their signs and their 
statistical significance. 
Second, one may be concerned that our models do not 
control adequately for variation in the quality of assistant 
professors across departments within each quality tier of 
departments. For example, suppose that within quality tier 3 
(departments ranked 16-30), department 16 recruits "bet- 
ter" assistant professors than department 30 and pays them 
the higher salaries that their greater market value requires. 
Suppose also that department 16 also maintains a higher 
tenure threshold, so much higher that its promotion rate is 
lower despite its higher quality of assistant professors. In 
this case, department 16 would simultaneously exhibit a 
lower promotion rate and a higher starting salary even in the 
absence of any compensating wage differential. Put another 
way, our estimate of the compensating wage differential 
would be biased because of our failing to adequately control 
for differences in faculty quality across institutions. 
We do not believe this to be a serious concern because, as 
noted in footnote 15, the within-tier correlations of our 
tenure rate variables and the departmental reputational rank 
are small. To test for this possibility, however, we reesti- 
mated the model in column 4, adding the reputational rank 
of the department as an additional explanatory variable. That 
is, we controlled for both the quality tier of the institution 
and its numerical reputational rank. When this was done, the 
coefficient of the tenure rate variable was unchanged. 
Third, when the model was estimated separately for 
Ph.D.s and ABDs, the tenure probability coefficient was 
larger in absolute value for the ABD subsample. Given the 
time pressures they face in trying to complete dissertations 
and begin an academic career at the same time, ABDs are 
less likely than Ph.D.s to amass a substantial research record 
during their probationary period. Hence they are the ones 
most likely to feel the adverse impact of low tenure 
probabilities and thus to receive the larger compensating 
wage differentials. 
Fourth, when the model was reestimated with the data 
stratified by higher (tiers 1-4) and lower (tier 5) quality 
departments, the tenure probability coefficient was largest in 
absolute value for the lower quality departments. Alternative 
employment opportunities in both the academic and nonaca- 
demic sectors are likely to be better for people denied tenure 
at the higher quality schools than for those denied tenure at 
the lower quality schools. Thus it is at the lower quality 
schools that the compensating wage differentials for tenure 
probabilities will be larger. 
Fifth, when the model was reestimated with the data 
stratified by early (1974/75 to 1977/78) and later (1978/79 to 
1980/81) years during the period, the tenure probability 
coefficient was larger in absolute value during the latter 
period and close to -0.1 during that time. The market for 
faculty was one of weak relative demand during the 
18 When we tested whether the marginal "implicit price" for tenure 
probabilities varied with the initial level of the tenure probability by 
including a quadratic tenure probability term in the model, the quadratic 
term never proved significant. Thus the assumption of only a linear effect 
implicit in equation (4) seems reasonable. 
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mid-1970s as real academic salaries declined, and it was 
only during our second period that relative demand tight- 
ened and real faculty salaries began to grow.19 Thus our 
finding here is consistent with the belief that compensating 
wage differentials will be larger when labor markets are 
relatively tight. 
Finally, a referee has suggested to us that our con- 
structed tenure probability variables measure the true 
subjective tenure probabilities faced by new assistant 
professors with error because the constructed tenure probabil- 
ity variables often were based on a small number of 
observations. While the mean number of new assistant 
professors in our sample hired by a department during the 
period was close to 10, one-tenth of the departments hired 
four or fewer assistant professors. Hence measurement error 
in the tenure probability variables may well be present. If 
measurement error was random, the coefficients of the 
tenure probability variables in table 3 would be biased 
toward zero and the table 3 estimates would understate the 
impact of tenure probability differences on starting salaries. 
To take account of this problem, an instrument for each of 
the tenure probability variables was obtained.20 When the 
model was reestimated using the instrumental-variable esti- 
mate for each tenure probability variable, rather than the 
actual value, in each case the estimated tenure probability 
coefficient in the salary equation did become larger in 
absolute value.21 However, the statistical significance of the 
coefficients was also reduced. 
V. Econometric Estimates: Tenured Faculty Salaries 
Lower tenure probabilities for assistant professors imply 
either that a department will have fewer tenured faculty in 
steady state or that it will hire a greater share of its tenured 
faculty from faculty already employed at other institutions. 
Tenured faculty hired away from other institutions typically 
earn more than tenured faculty promoted from within 
because the former must be induced to leave their original 
institution and compensated for the monetary and psychologi- 
cal costs of mobility that they face. 
To the extent that lower tenure probabilities for assistant 
professors do imply a greater share of tenured faculty hired 
from the external market, we should therefore expect to 
observe a negative relationship between assistant professors' 
tenure probabilities and the salaries of tenured faculty, in a 
department, other factors held constant. Moreover, the 
tenure probability measure most closely related to tenured 
faculty members' salaries in this case is likely to be TEN3, 
the probability of receiving tenure at the institution itself. 
Furthermore, the relevant tenure probability variable here is 
the actual, ex post tenure probability, since it is this variable 
that may influence the fraction of associate professors hired 
from the external market. 
Expected tenure probabilities may also influence the 
salaries of associate professors who are promoted from 
within a department. In particular, low expected tenure 
probabilities may induce new assistant professors to work 
harder so that if they fail to get tenure, they will be worth 
more to other departments. This increased effort should also 
increase their productivity at their original department and 
hence their salaries if they are promoted. Put another way, 
low expected tenure probabilities, can be thought of as being 
part of tournaments with greater rewards for winning.22 This 
suggests that the expected tenure probabilities, as measured 
by the instruments for tenure probabilities that we have 
obtained, should also be included in tenured faculty mem- 
bers' salary equations and that we should expect to observe a 
negative relationship between these variables and tenured 
faculty salaries as well. 
Panel A of table 4 uses data from the AEA annual salary 
survey on average salaries for associate professors of 
TABLE 4.-DETERMINANTS OF THE LOGARITHM OF AVERAGE ASSOCIATE 
PROFESSOR SALARIES AND THE RATIO OF AVERAGE ASSOCIATE TO AVERAGE 
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR SALARIES IN ECONOMICS DEPARTMENTS AT PH.D. 
GRANTING INSTITUTIONS: AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 1974-75 TO 
1980-81 SAMPLE (ABSOLUTE VALUE T STATISTICS) 
Tenure Probability Coefficients 
TEN1 TEN2 TEN3 TEN4 
A) Logarithm of 
Associate Pro- 
fessor Salariesa 
1) Actual Tenure 
Probability -.040 (1.4) -.044 (1.5) -.032 (1.1) -.044 (1.6) 
2) Predicted Tenure 
Probability -.307 (5.1) -.326 (5.0) -.377 (6.5) -.397 (6.0) 
R2 .729 .750 .773 .763 
B) Ratio of Average 
Associate to 
Average Assistant 
Professor Sala- 
riesb 
1) Actual Tenure 
Probability -.020 (0.5) -.027 (0.7) -.029 (0.6) -.021 (0.6) 
2) Predicted Tenure 
Probability -.530 (8.0) -.572 (7.6) -.616 (9.8) -.636 (8.6) 
R2 .288 .258 .387 .301 
Notes: a Also included in each equation were all of the valiables from Table 3 save for PHD and 
RASSOC. 
b Also included in each equation were year and tier dichotomous variables. 
TEN 1 TEN2 TEN3 TEN4 
Table 3 
estimate -0.052 (2.2) -0.060 (2.6) -0.052 (2.2) -0.068 (3.0) 
Instrumental- 
variable 
estimate -0.088 (1.6) -0.067 (1.0) -0.090 (1.5) -0.069 (1.0) 
19 See American Association of University Professors (1997, fig. 1). 
20 The instruments for each tenure probability variable were ob- 
tained from equations that included the selectivity of the institution, 
as measured by its Barron's (1982) rating (broken into six selec- 
tivity classes), the institution's student-faculty ratio, the percentage 
of the institution's faculty members that had Ph.D. degrees, and all of the 
exogenous variables from table 3, except for the year and departmental 
quality dichotomous variables. 
21 Specifically, the coefficients and standard errors of the tenure probabil- 
ity variables changed as indicated: 
22 See Lazear and Rosen (1981). In terms of the model used in this paper, the 
implication of their model is that gi and Ci should be inversely related to Ti. 
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economics to test these hypotheses. Equations similar to 
equation (4) are estimated, save that the logarithm of the 
average associate professor salary is now the dependent 
variable, both the actual and estimated tenure probability 
variables are included in the equation, and the new Ph.D. 
variable (PHD) and the ratio of average associate to average 
assistant professor salaries (RASSOC) are excluded from the 
analyses. The coefficients for the various tenure probability 
variables are found in panel A of the table. 
Quite strikingly, lower tenure probabilities for assistant 
professors are associated, other factors held constant, with 
higher salaries for associate professors, and TEN3 is the best 
performing tenure probability variable. This association is 
statistically significantly different from zero, however, only 
for the predicted tenure probability variables not the actual 
ones. Hence, the primary route that low tenure probabilities 
raise associate professor salaries is through their effects on 
assistant professor effort/productivity, not through compen- 
sating wage differentials that must be paid to attract associ- 
ate professors from the external market. 
Including the reputational rank of the department, in 
addition to its tier, to better control for differences in the 
quality of associate professors across institutions, does not 
change the magnitude or statistical significance of this 
relationship. Reducing TEN3 from its mean in the sample of 
roughly 0.4 (table 2) to 0 implies an increase in the average 
associate professor salary of roughly 12%. Similarly, reduc- 
ing this tenure probability by 0.1 implies an increase in the 
average salary of associate professors of roughly 2.2%. 
Lower tenure probabilities for assistant professors in a 
department thus lead to increases in both new assistant 
professor and average associate professor salaries.23 
Of course, these analyses suggest that the estimates in 
table 3, which treat the ratio of average associate to average 
assistant professor salaries as predetermined may overstate 
the extent to which changes in tenure probabilities influence 
new assistant professor salaries. To see why this is true, 
panel B of table 4 shows the tenure probability coefficients 
that result when the ratio of average associate to average 
assistant professor salaries RASSOC was regressed on each 
tenure probability and a set of year and tier dichotomous 
variables. In each case, the tenure probability coefficients are 
negative, again primarily for the predicted rather than actual 
tenure probability variable, implying that higher tenure 
probabilities imply lower growth rates of salary across 
ranks. 
Returning to equation (4), it is straightforward to show 
that 
aWpi b3agi 
, 
- 
, nb1 + (5) a TPi dPi 
where gi equals RASSOC. Since b3 is always less than zero in 
table 3, it follows that the tenure probability coefficients in 
table 3 overstate (in absolute value) the magnitude of the 
tradeoff between new assistant professor salaries and the 
tenure probabilities that they face. 
Put another way, these results suggest that the cost to an 
economics department of unilaterally reducing the tenure 
probability that its assistant professors faced during the 
1970s was not primarily the higher salaries that it had to pay 
to attract new assistant professors. Rather, it was the higher 
salaries it had to pay because of the higher productivity such 
an action induced for the tenured associate professors it 
promoted and tenured from within.24 
VI. Concluding Remarks, Qualifications, and Extensions 
The analyses of the previous sections provided estimates 
of the likely impact on starting faculty salaries and tenured 
faculty salaries at institutions that unilaterally decide to 
substantially reduce the probabilities that new assistant 
professors ultimately receive tenure at them, if only a small 
number of institutions make such changes. However, analy- 
ses of this type cannot provide any evidence on what the 
likely impact of substantially changing the average probabil- 
ity (across institutions) of a new assistant professor's 
receiving tenure would be on the average salary that 
academic institutions must pay.25 To answer the latter 
question requires evidence on how changes in average 
tenure probabilities influence the distribution of new Ph.D.s 
between the nonacademic and academic sectors and how 
they affect the willingness of potential Ph.D. students to 
embark upon and complete Ph.D. studies. 
While a number of empirical studies have addressed the 
determinants of the supply of new doctorates in the aggre- 
gate (see the summary in Ehrenberg (1992)) and a smaller 
number have addressed the decisions by new Ph.D.s whether 
23 A similar tradeoff does not appear in these data between the average 
salary of full professors in a department and the tenure probabilities faced 
by assistant professors. We believe that this is due to measurement error 
problems induced by our inability to control for differences in the seniority 
distribution of full professors across departments. This is less of a problem 
with the data on the average salaries of associate professors, since most 
people spend less than six years in this rank. 
24 A referee has expressed the concern that our analyses of associate 
professor salaries may be contaminated by a number of institutions not 
giving tenure to faculty until they achieve full professor rank. The mean 
proportion of associate professors with tenure in our sample was 0.8 across 
the 87 institutions in the sample in the early 1980s (American Association 
of University Professors (1982), with only 5 institutions' proportion of 
associate professors with tenure falling below 0.5 (Carnegie Mellon, 
Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Wyoming, and Yale). Exclusion of the observa- 
tions from these institutions from the sample and reestimation of the 
models underlying table 4 yielded a similar pattern of results to those 
reported in the table. 
25 Our analyses also do not indicate what would happen to an individual 
department that unilaterally opted out of the tenure system altogether. 
Presumably such a department would not only reduce the tenure rate to 
zero, but would also eliminate the "up or out" feature of the tenure system. 
Removing the prospect of tenure would be viewed as "bad" by prospective 
new faculty, but removing the "out" part of "up or out" would be viewed 
as good. Hence the net effect on starting salaries would be indeterminate. 
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to accept employment in the academic or nonacademic 
sectors (e.g., Hansen et al. (1980), Stapleton (1989), Free- 
man (1975)), none have addressed the role of tenure 
probabilities in these decisions. Future research should 
attempt to conceptualize more ftlly the role that tenure 
probabilities play in influencing the aggregate supply of new 
Ph.D.s, the allocation of these Ph.D.s across academic and 
nonacademic employment, and academic salary levels and 
then, if possible, to estimate these relationships. 
It would also be worthwhile for researchers to replicate 
the analyses described above for a field which has less 
promising nonacademic employment opportunities than does 
economics. One would expect to find compensating wage 
differentials for tenure probabilities higher in fields with 
poorer nonacademic employment opportunities. That is, the 
estimates presented in this paper may well understate the 
impact of changing tenure probabilities in fields with less 
promising nonacademic employment opportunities. 
Our estimates used salary data for the 1974/75 to 1980/81 
period. This period was dictated by the availability of tenure 
probability data and the willingness of the AEA to provide us 
with salary data. However, much of this period was a period 
of excess supply in the academic labor market in which real 
academic salaries fell. Compensating wage differentials for 
undesirable job characteristics, such as low tenure probabili- 
ties, are likely to be smaller in periods of excess supply than 
they are in periods of tight labor markets. Thus our estimates 
likely understate the impact of changing tenure probabilities 
in periods when the labor market for faculty is tight, such as 
has been projected by some for the years ahead.26 
Finally, we must stress that the implications that we have 
drawn about how a change in tenure probabilities by a small 
number of departments would affect those departments' 
starting salaries all assume that the starting salary-tenure 
probability relationship that we have estimated is due to our 
postulated hypothesis. However, our attempts to control for 
the quality of an institution's new hires by including the 
distribution of its new hires across quality tiers of institu- 
tions as explanatory variables (see section IV) may well be 
inadequate. We thank the editors and an anonymous referee 
for cautioning us on this point. There is tremendous varia- 
tion in the quality of students seeking employment from 
each graduate program in any one year. The quality of a 
Cornell PhD student who is hired at Harvard, for example, is 
likely to be very different than the quality of a Cornell PhD 
student hired at "Podunk." Our inability to finely control for 
the quality of new hires at each institution leaves open the 
possibility that our results reflect unobservable quality 
differences rather than compensating salary differences for 
different tenure probabilities. 
Two possible approaches exist to trying to rule out this 
alternative hypothesis. One would be to obtain data on each 
department's rankings of its graduate students and use this, 
as well as the ratings of graduate department, to better 
control for the quality of each department's new assistant 
professor hires. A second would be to develop data for a 
second period, to assume that the unobserved quality of each 
department's new hires did not vary much over time and 
then estimate models of the change in each institution's 
starting salaries for assistant professors as a function of the 
changes in its tenure probability, quality ranking, and so on. 
That is, one could use a fixed-effects model to try to 
eliminate any unobservable differences in the quality of new 
assistant professors across departments. Neither of these 
solutions is feasible given the data we currently have, but 
future research should consider them. Our own prior is that it 
will be a lot easier to implement the second approach than 
the first. 
26 See, for example, Bowen and Sosa (1989). 
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